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ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper compares the association between transparency and firm value between U.S. 
and non-U.S. firms. I show that firm value is more sensitive to disclosure quality and corporate 
governance in global companies than in U.S. companies. I adopt and modify the Disaggregation 
Index by Chen et al. (2015), a measure of disclosure quality, and apply it towards global companies 
reporting under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). By showing the differential 
effects of transparency on firm value, this paper sheds light on an important concern expressed by 
U.S. investors when investing in in global equities, and aims to partly explain the difference in 
betas between U.S. and global firms. I hypothesize U.S. equity home bias to be the main driver of 
the difference in coefficients, but conclude that change in U.S. ownership is not sufficient in 
explaining the differential effects. 
 
Keywords: Disclosure quality, Corporate governance, International accounting, Home bias 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many studies highlight the negative association between firm value and disclosure quality 
(Lambert et al. 2007; Botosan 1997), as well as the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm value (Carter et al. 2003). Low disclosure quality and poor corporate governance have been 
shown to discourage investments, leading to lower equity prices. This research aims to connect 
investor’s home bias with firm value discount due to lower transparency by comparing the 
magnitude of discount in U.S. and non-U.S. companies. This study hypothesizes that the 
magnitude of stock price discount will be significantly larger in foreign companies compared to 
that of U.S companies. That is, although investors will pay less for less transparent firms in both 
markets, the punishment will be severe for global companies. There is much research on lower 
disclosure quality and discount in non-U.S. markets (Bradshaw et al. 2004; Zhou 2007), but this 
research will contribute to the literature by verifying that the magnitude of discount is different 
when comparing non-U.S. markets with U.S. markets. I expect that U.S. investors will be more 
sensitive to lower disclosure quality and poor corporate governance in foreign companies, leading 
to a greater degree of firm value discount. This research will address the concerns of U.S. investors 
on non-U.S. companies and suggest further research topics on the area.  
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews related literature, section 3 elaborates 
on the research approach and hypotheses, and section 4 discusses data and the research methods. 
Results are shown in section 5 followed by discussion on section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
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 It is generally agreed upon in international finance that home bias exists for U.S. investors.  
This manifests via underinvestment in foreign equities due to higher informational costs 
(Bradshaw et al. 2004) or corporate governance concerns (Dahlquist et al. 2003; Carter et al. 2003). 
In addition, emerging market discounts, attributed to low information transparency and instabilities 
related to each country, are known to drive down stock prices of emerging markets to lower levels 
than their U.S. comparables. This research will show that companies in non-U.S. markets are being 
discounted more heavily based on disclosure quality and corporate governance, addressing a major 
concern of U.S. investors when investing abroad.  
  
Home Bias 
 Equity home bias is the phenomenon of individuals holding less than optimal level of 
foreign assets. Using CAPM, Lewis (1999) suggests that the foreign equity share in mutual funds 
are significantly below the level of the so-called “efficient frontier”, although the amount has been 
increasing in time. This implies that funds are not taking the option of what the CAPM suggests 
should be diversifying risks away for free. Various research has given possible explanations on 
this observation. Investing in foreign equity can be costlier due to difficulties in acquiring 
information about the market and the companies (Lewis 1999). Other research focuses on the poor 
quality and low credibility of accounting information of foreign companies, and evaluates the 
correlation between US ownership and US GAAP conformity level of foreign companies’ 
accounting information (Ahearne et al. 2004; Bradshaw et al. 2004). Dahlquist et al. (2003) links 
home bias with corporate governance, claiming that investor rights and ownership structure are 
more attributable to home bias while barrier to international investment is decreasing. Our research 
will focus on disclosure quality and corporate governance and how investors are more sensitive on 
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these issues when investing on foreign equities. 
 
Disclosure Quality 
 Prior research has introduced models and indices evaluating disclosure quality of financial 
statements. Singhvi and Desai (1971) suggest an index of disclosure using 34 questionnaires 
including number of years included in summary of important financial statistics, method of 
inventory valuation, information on labor contracts, inventory breakdown, et cetera. A more 
modern approach on evaluating disclosure quality is suggested by Chen et al. (2015). They propose 
using the level of disaggregation of accounting data in measuring disclosure quality. By counting 
the number of non-missing subaccounts in the Compustat data, Chen et al. came up with a 
disclosure measure using the entire balance sheet and income statement, which is distinctive from 
previous indices such as AIMR scores or the index by Botosan (1997), which focused on voluntary 
disclosures or only on certain parts of the financial statements, such as the Management Discussion 
and Analysis. 
 Further research has studied the relationship between higher disclosure level and lower 
cost of capital (Botosan 1997; Hearly et al. 1999). Disclosure quality is negatively correlated with 
analyst forecast dispersion, bid-ask spread, and cost of equity (Chen et al. 2015). Lambert et al. 
(2007) explain that the quality of accounting information affects firms’ cost of capital in both direct 
and indirect ways, directly by altering market’s perception about the dispersion of firms’ future 
cash flows and indirectly by influencing the real decisions that companies make. This research will 
focus on the differential effect on firm value on U.S. and non-U.S. companies associated with 
disclosure quality, as measured by the Disaggregation Index proposed by Chen et al. (2015). 
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Corporate Governance 
 Corporations have provisions to protect minority shareholders from expropriation by 
managers and controlling shareholders (La Porta et al. 2000). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) identify 
corporate governance as the ways financiers assure that they get return on their financial 
investments. Gompers et al. (2003) classify governance provisions into five categories of delay, 
protection, voting, state of incorporation, and other, to construct an index of corporate governance. 
They also show by using their index that better corporate governance leads to higher equity prices. 
Other research suggest that board diversity (Carter et al. 2003) and commitment to business ethics 
(Pae and Choi 2011) leads to higher firm value. 
 
Non-US Markets  
 Previous literature examines the disclosure qualities of emerging markets in various 
perspectives, including regulation, auditing standards, and management. Barth et al. (2008) studied 
how the application of International Accounting Standards (IAS) is associated with higher 
accounting quality in non-US markets. Zhou (2007) examined the effect of new auditing standards 
in China on informational asymmetry. Although new standards significantly lowered the bid-ask 
spread, Zhou showed that foreign ownership of those control groups did not change. Hail and Leuz 
(2009) examine the cost of capital of companies cross-listed in the U.S. and demonstrated that 
cross-listed firms have a lower cost of capital. Pae and Choi (2011) tested the correlation between 
corporate governance, management commitment to business ethics, and firm valuation for Korean 
corporations. Porta et al. (2006) evaluate disclosure regulations of various countries. Ball et al. 
(2000) focus on how international institutional factors affect properties of accounting earnings, 
while Isidro et al. (2016) attempt to revisit the country attributes that were shown to affect financial 
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reporting quality and tested their validity.  
 
III. RESEARCH APPROACH AND MODEL 
 
 Motivated by the previous literature connecting disclosure quality and corporate 
governance with firm value, this study will compare the slope of the regression between U.S. and 
non-U.S. companies. I expect that non-U.S. companies will exhibit a greater degree of firm value 
discount. I first reaffirm the relationship of disclosure quality and corporate governance with firm 
value in US and global companies, stated formally in the following hypotheses:  
 
H1: Firm value is positively associated with disclosure quality for non-U.S. companies. 
H2: Firm value is positively associated with corporate governance for non-U.S. companies. 
 
 Tests on H1 and H2 will show the association between transparency and firm value in a 
stand-alone setting. After confirming the correlation between the indices and firm value, I move 
on to test our main hypothesis, that the degree of firm value discount is greater in non-U.S. 
companies. 
 
H3: Firm value discount due to lower disclosure quality is significantly larger in non-U.S. 
companies than in U.S. companies. 
H4: Firm value discount due to poor corporate governance is significantly larger in non-U.S. 
companies than in U.S. companies. 
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<Figure 1: Research Model> 
 
 Figure 1 summarizes the main research model of this paper. I utilize an OLS Regression 
with dummy variables indicating U.S. or non-U.S. firms to show the differential slopes for 
disclosure quality and corporate governance between U.S. and non-U.S. firms. I include the natural 
log of total assets, EBIT-to-sales ratio, and ratio of capital expenditure to sales were added as 
control variables to control for firm size, profitability, and growth opportunities, respectively 
(Berger and Ofek 1995). The estimation model is as follows. 
 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄% = 	𝛽) + 𝛽+𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒_𝐷𝑄% +	𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒_𝐺𝐼% +	𝛽5𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙% +	𝛽9𝐷𝑄 ∗ 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙% +	𝛽;𝐺𝐼 ∗ 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙% +	𝛽<𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝐴𝑇% +	𝛽@𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇_𝑅𝐸𝑉% +	𝛽D𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋_𝑅𝐸𝑉% +	𝜀% 
 
 For non-US companies, I perform additional analyses regressing U.S. ownership on 
transparency to quantify the U.S. equity home bias related to disclosure quality and corporate 
governance. 
 
Disclosure 
Quality
Decile_DQ
Corporate
Governance
Decile_GI
Firm Value
(Tobin’s Q)
TOBQ
Firm Size
Log_AT
Profitability
EBIT_REV
Growth
CAPX_REV
Interaction
(Global = 1, 
US = 0)
GLOBAL
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IV. DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Data on Disclosure Quality, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value 
 Disclosure quality is measured using the Disaggregation Quality (DQ) proposed by Chen 
et al. (2015). This index is calculated as the proportion of non-missing Compustat subaccounts in 
both the balance sheet and the income statement. DQ captures the fineness of financial data and 
how detailed the disclosure information is. Finer information reduces information asymmetry and 
leads to more accurate valuation (Fairfield et al. 1996; Jegadeesh and Livnat 2006). DQ also 
captures the credibility of disclosure information, as management would have less discretion on 
its reporting numbers when it is reporting through more detailed subaccounts (Hirst et al. 2007; 
D’Souza et al. 2010). Chen et al. (2015) show that the index agrees with the previous information 
quality indices through validation tests examining association with analyst forecast dispersion, 
forecast accuracy, bid-ask spread, and cost of equity.  
 I use Disaggregation Quality (DQ) over other measures of information quality because of 
its subjectivity. DQ does not require any judgement by its users. Also, DQ could be easily 
replicated using the Compustat data, which includes disclosure data for a wide range of firms. 
Some adjustments were required on DQ for global companies since it is only applicable to firms 
under US GAAP. I replicated the process of identifying subaccounts and parent accounts in IFRS, 
and calculated DQ for balance sheet and income statement for global companies (Appendix A, B). 
Because IFRS tend to be more principles-based standards, as opposed to rules-based standards 
under U.S. GAAP, the number of subaccounts for IFRS in Compustat are smaller compared to US 
GAAP.  
 One of the most widely used measures of corporate governance is the Governance Index 
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proposed by Gompers et al. (2003). The Governance Index is simply the sum of numbers of 
provisions that restricts shareholder rights. The provisions are divided into five categories of Delay, 
Protection, Voting, Other, and State. There are total of 24 provisions that are tested, and this 
measure also does not require any judgement by the user. The Governance Index for US companies 
is accessible through ISS (formerly RiskMetrics). Since Governance Index is not available for 
global companies, WGI by World Bank, a country-level data on corporate governance is used 
instead. Global companies have different institutional and legal characteristics based on their 
domiciled country, and country-level characteristics are important factors of firm-level corporate 
governance (La Porta et al 2006; Henry 2000). Using country-level data on corporate governance 
might potentially introduce a problematic assumption that underlying governance level of 
companies in a given country is the same. Without finer firm-level data on governance, however, 
I cannot obtain a more detailed measure of firm-level corporate governance for non-U.S. firms. 
 Firm value is measured through Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as Equity Market Value 
divided by Equity Book Value. Tobin’s Q estimates how a firm is undervalued or overvalued. A 
higher Tobin’s Q value indicate that the investors are willing to pay more than the company’s book 
value for its equity.  
 
Research Method 
 I conduct OLS regression analyses to verify the association among DQ, Governance Index 
and Tobin’s Q. After showing that DQ and Governance Index are correlated with firm value for 
both US and global companies, the coefficients of US and global companies are compared to test 
the main hypothesis. Since DQ for US firms and DQ for global firms are somewhat different, direct 
comparison cannot be made between the two groups. Rather, DQ for US firms and DQ for global 
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firms are categorized into deciles from the highest to the lowest. Here I am not making assumption 
that the average levels of disclosure quality in US and non-US countries are the same. Only the 
association between relative transparency within its group and firm value is tested. 
 The sample consists of 2,440 firm years, with 1,285 firm years of US companies in S&P 
Composite 1500 Index and 1,155 global companies included in S&P 700.  
 
V. RESULTS 
 
 Table 1 demonstrates the OLS regression result for U.S. companies. As hypothesized, 
disclosure quality measured by Disaggregation Quality is positively correlated with firm value. 
Corporate governance, on the other hand, did not show a statistically significant result. The OLS 
regression result for global companies is presented in Table 2 (H1, H2). As in U.S. companies, 
disclosure quality is again positively correlated with firm value; however, it is mildly significant. 
Corporate governance is not a statistically significant factor for global companies’ firm value.  
 
 Table 1: OLS Regression Results on US Companies  
      
 coef Std err t P > |t| [95.0% Conf. Int.] 
Const 2.2768 0.226 10.086 0.000 1.834 2.720 
Decile_DQ 0.0344 0.013 2.593 0.010 0.008 0.060 
Decile_GI 0.0051 0.013 0.390 0.696 -0.020 0.031 
Log_AT -0.1254 0.026 -4.570 0.000 -0.176 -0.075 
EBIT_REV 0.5701 0.111 5.149 0.000 0.353 0.787 
CAPX_REV -0.0239 0.247 -0.097 0.923 -0.508 0.461 
 
 Table 2: OLS Regression Results on Global Companies  
      
 coef Std err t P > |t| [95.0% Conf. Int.] 
Const 3.4903 2.665 1.310 0.191 -1.738 8.718 
Decile_DQ 0.1484 0.099 1.506 0.132 -0.045 0.342 
12 
Decile_GI 0.2109 0.212 0.993 0.321 -0.206 0.628 
Log_AT -0.3414 0.113 -3.014 0.003 -0.564 -0.119 
EBIT_REV 14.6029 2.443 5.977 0.000 9.810 19.396 
CAPX_REV -8.1465 3.036 -2.683 0.007 -14.104 -2.189 
 
  
 Table 3 shows the results of our main hypotheses (H3, H4). As expected, the interaction 
terms, DQ*Global and GI*Global, showed positive coefficients. DQ*Global is statistically 
significantly association with firm value, while GI*Global is only marginally significant. These 
results support our model that the firm value of global companies are more sensitive to 
transparency. I also observe that the main effect of Decile_DQ, which was positively significant 
in both US and non-US companies (Table 1, 2) goes away once the interaction term is included.  
 
 Table 3: OLS Regression Results with Interaction Terms  
      
 coef Std err t P > |t| [95.0% Conf. Int.] 
Const 4.1190 0.724 5.689 0.000 2.699 5.539 
Decile_DQ -0.0197 0.064 -0.306 0.760 -0.146 0.107 
Decile_GI 0.0446 0.063 0.708 0.479 -0.079 0.168 
Global -0.1863 1.429 -0.130 0.896 -2.988 2.615 
DQ*Global 0.1921 0.093 2.069 0.039 0.010 0.374 
GI*Global 0.2416 0.162 1.492 0.136 -0.076 0.559 
Log_AT -0.3516 0.067 -5.219 0.000 -0.484 -0.220 
EBIT_REV 1.4750 0.501 2.945 0.003 0.493 2.457 
CAPX_REV -0.1633 1.054 -0.155 0.977 -2.229 1.903 
 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
 
 By testing our hypothesis, I examine whether the effect of transparency on firm value is 
greater in global companies. I perform additional analysis to discover the causes driving the 
difference in coefficients. The underlying assumption is that that global companies’ firm value 
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will be more sensitive to their transparency level due to U.S. being more responsive to the 
transparency level of non-U.S. companies. Prior literature discussed on US investors’ concerns on 
global companies in various aspects, focusing on higher informational costs. Bradshaw et al. (2004) 
show that accounting choices in global companies affect U.S. investors’ behavior, while DeFond 
and Hung (2007) find that analysts provide cash flow forecasts more frequently in countries with 
poor investor protection. To examine the effect of U.S. equity home bias on the results, I perform 
a regression analysis of U.S. ownership proportion on disclosure quality. The regression showed 
a positive association between U.S. ownership and disclosure quality, however, the association 
was not statistically significant. Figure 2 depicts the fitted line between two variables.  
 
 
<Figure 2: US Ownership on Disclosure Quality> 
 
 The additional analysis show that the difference in coefficients between U.S. and non-U.S. 
companies cannot be fully explained by U.S. equity home bias. Further research in this area should 
investigate the driver of the difference in coefficients. Another limitation in this study is the use of 
country-level data in measuring corporate governance for global companies. Although country-
14 
level characteristics are shown to be important factors of firm-level corporate governance in global 
setting, it is clear that more detailed analysis would have been possible with firm-level data. The 
statistical significance on the association between governance and firm value might also be 
stronger with more granular firm-level data on global companies, rather than the more coarse 
country-level data.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 I find that firm value is more sensitive to transparency in non-U.S. companies compared 
to U.S. companies. I also confirm the association among disclosure quality, corporate governance, 
and firm value after replicating Disaggregation Index (Chen et al. 2015) to the IFRS setting. The 
underlying presumption is that the U.S. equity home bias would be the major factor leading the 
difference in coefficients, however additional analysis showed that home bias is not sufficient in 
explaining the different slopes.  
 This research contributes to the existing literature by showing that companies in non-U.S. 
emerging markets are punished more heavily on lower disclosure quality and poor corporate 
governance compared to U.S. companies. This paper attempts to make meaningful connections by 
discussing transparency in US and global settings, as well as by connecting U.S. equity home bias 
to firm transparency. Further research can further explore the drivers of differential sensitivity of 
firm value on transparency and investigate further on U.S. investors’ concern in investing on global 
equities. Comparison among various emerging markets to specify the investors sentiment on each 
market is also a plausible research topic, once firm-level data on corporate governance in non-U.S. 
firms is available. 
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Appendix A. Linking Table for Balance Sheet – IFRS  
SUB ACCOUNTS DESCRIPTION PARENT  GROUP 
CH Cash and Due from Banks CHE ACT 
IVST Short-term Investments – Total CHE ACT 
RECTR Accounts Receivable/Debtors – Trade RECT ACT 
RECCO Accounts Receivable/Debtors – Other  RECT ACT 
INVRM Inventories/Stocks – Raw Materials INVT ACT 
INVWIP Inventories/Stocks – Work in Progress INVT ACT 
INVFG Inventories/Stocks – Finished Goods INVT ACT 
INVO Inventories/Stocks – Other INVT ACT 
XPP Prepaid Expense ACO ACT 
TSCA Treasury Stock (Current Assets) ACO ACT 
ACOX Current Assets – Other Excluding Prepaid Expense ACO ACT 
CHE Cash and Short-term Investments ACT AT 
RECT Accounts Receivable/Debtors – Total ACT AT 
INVT Inventories/Stocks – Total ACT AT 
ACO Current Assets – Other – Total ACT AT 
PPEGT Property, Plant and Equipment (Gross) – Total PPENT AT 
DPACT Depreciation and Amortization (Accumulated) (-) PPENT AT 
IVGOD Investment Grants and Other Deductions (-) PPENT AT 
DC Deferred Charges AO AT 
TSTLTA Treasury Stock (Long-term Assets) AO AT 
UNL Unappropriated Net Loss AO AT 
EA Exchange Adjustments (Assets) AO AT 
AOX Assets – Other – Excluding Deferred Charges AO AT 
ACT Current Assets – Total AT AT 
PPENT Property, Plant, and Equipment (Net) – Total AT AT 
19 
IVAEQ Investments and Advances – Equity Method AT AT 
IVAO Investments and Advances – Other AT AT 
INTAN Intangibles AT AT 
AO Assets – Other AT AT 
DD1 Long-term Debt Due in One Year DLC LCT 
NP Notes Payable DLC LCT 
XACC Accrued Expenses LCO LCT 
TXP Taxes Payable LCO LCT 
APO Accounts Payable/Creditors – Others LCO LCT 
PRODV Proposed Dividends LCO LCT 
LCOX Current Liabilities – Other – Excluding Accrued Expense LCO LCT 
MIB Redeemable Noncontrolling Interest MIBT LT 
MIBN Nonredeemable Noncontrolling Interest MIBT LT 
DLC Debt in Current Liabilities LCT LT 
AP Accounts Payable LCT LT 
LCO Current Liabilities – Other LCT LT 
LCT Current Liabilities – Total LT LT 
TXDB Deferred Taxes (Balance Sheet) LT LT 
DLTT Long-term Debt – Total LT LT 
MIB Minority Interest (Balance Sheet) LT LT 
RVUTX Reserves – Untaxed LT LT 
LO Liabilities - Other LT LT 
PSTKR Preferred Stock – Redeemable PSTK SEQ 
PSTKN Preferred Stock – Nonredeemable PSTK SEQ 
PSTK Preferred Stock - Total SEQ SEQ 
CSTK Common Stock SEQ SEQ 
SCO Share Capital - Other SEQ SEQ 
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PRC Participation Rights Certificates SEQ SEQ 
TSTK Treasury Stock – All Capital – Total SEQ SEQ 
CAPS Capital Surplus/Share Premium Reserve SEQ SEQ 
RVLRV Revaluation Reserve SEQ SEQ 
RE Retained Earnings SEQ SEQ 
UNNP Unappropriated Net Profit (Shareholders’ Equity) SEQ SEQ 
ERO Equity Reserves – Other) SEQ SEQ 
TRANSA Cumulative Translation Adjustment SEQ SEQ 
 
 
Appendix B. Linking Table for Income Statement – IFRS  
SUB ACCOUNTS DESCRIPTION GROUP 
COGS Cost of Goods Sold XOPR 
XSGA Selling, General, and Administrative Expense XOPR 
RAWMSM Raw Materials, Supplies and Merchandise XOPR 
STKCH Change in Stocks (-) XOPR 
CAPCST Capitalized Costs (-) XOPR 
XSTF Staff Expense – Total XOPR 
XOPRO Operating Expense – Other XOPR 
DFXA Depreciation of Fixed Assets (Tangible) DP 
AM Amortization of Intangibles DP 
INTC Interest Capitalized NOPI 
IDIT Interest and Dividend Income – Total NOPI 
NOPI Nonoperating Income (Expense)  NOPI 
TXC Income Taxes – Current TXT 
TXDI Deferred Taxes (Income Account) TXT 
TXO Income Taxes – Other TXT 
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EIEA Equity in Earnings – After Tax NIT 
PACQP Preacquisition Profits NIT 
NIO Net Items – Other NIT 
DVP Dividends – Peferred DVT 
DVC Dividends – Common/Ordinary DVT 
DVSCO Dividends – Share Capital - Other DVT 
 
 
Appendix C. Linking Table for the Balance Sheet – US GAAP  
 Refer to the Internet Appendix of Chen et al. (2015) 
 
 
